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Abstract
Graph neural networks (GNNs) which apply the
deep neural networks to graph data have achieved
significant performance for the task of semi-
supervised node classification. However, only
few work has addressed the adversarial robust-
ness of GNNs. In this paper, we first present
a novel gradient-based attack method that facili-
tates the difficulty of tackling discrete graph data.
When comparing to current adversarial attacks on
GNNs, the results show that by only perturbing a
small number of edge perturbations, including ad-
dition and deletion, our optimization-based attack
can lead to a noticeable decrease in classification
performance. Moreover, leveraging our gradient-
based attack, we propose the first optimization-
based adversarial training for GNNs. Our method
yields higher robustness against both different gra-
dient based and greedy attack methods without sac-
rificing classification accuracy on original graph.
Code is available at https://github.com/
KaidiXu/GCN_ADV_Train.
1 Introduction
Graph structured data plays a crucial role in many AI ap-
plications. It is an important and versatile representation to
model a wide variety of datasets from many domains, such
as molecules, social networks, or interlinked documents with
citations. Graph neural networks (GNNs) on graph struc-
tured data have shown outstanding results in various appli-
cations [Kipf and Welling, 2016; Velicˇkovic´ et al., 2017;
Xu et al., 2019a]. However, despite the great success on in-
ferring from graph data, the inherent challenge of lacking ad-
versarial robustness in deep learning models still carries over
to security-related domains such as blockchain or communi-
cation networks.
In this paper, we aim to evaluate the robustness of GNNs
from a perspective of first-order optimization adversarial at-
tacks. It is worth mentioning that first-order methods have
∗Equal contribution
achieved great success for generating adversarial attacks on
audios or images [Carlini and Wagner, 2018; Xu et al., 2019b;
Chen et al., 2018b; Xu et al., 2019c; Chen et al., 2018a].
However, some recent works [Dai et al., 2018; Bojcheski and
Gu¨nnemann, 2018] suggested that conventional (first-order)
continuous optimization methods do not directly apply to at-
tacks using edge manipulations (we call topology attack) due
to the discrete nature of graphs. We close this gap by studying
the problem of generating topology attacks via convex relax-
ation so that gradient-based adversarial attacks become plau-
sible for GNNs. Benchmarking on node classification tasks
using GNNs, our gradient-based topology attacks outperform
current state-of-the-art attacks subject to the same topology
perturbation budget. This demonstrates the effectiveness of
our attack generation method through the lens of convex re-
laxation and first-order optimization. Moreover, by leverag-
ing our proposed gradient-based attack, we propose the first
optimization-based adversarial training technique for GNNs,
yielding significantly improved robustness against gradient-
based and greedy topology attacks.
Our new attack generation and adversarial training meth-
ods for GNNs are built upon the theoretical foundation of
spectral graph theory, first-order optimization, and robust
(mini-max) optimization. We summarize our main contribu-
tions as follows:
• We propose a general first-order attack generation
framework under two attacking scenarios: a) attacking
a pre-defined GNN and b) attacking a re-trainable GNN.
This yields two new topology attacks: projected gradi-
ent descent (PGD) topology attack and min-max topol-
ogy attack. Experimental results show that the proposed
attacks outperform current state-of-the-art attacks.
• With the aid of our first-order attack generation methods,
we propose an adversarial training method for GNNs
to improve their robustness. The effectiveness of our
method is shown by the considerable improvement of ro-
bustness on GNNs against both optimization-based and
greedy-search-based topology attacks.
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2 Related Works
Some recent attentions have been paid to the robustness of
graph neural network. Both [Zu¨gner et al., 2018] and [Dai et
al., 2018] studied adversarial attacks on neural networks for
graph data. [Dai et al., 2018] studied test-time non-targeted
adversarial attacks on both graph classification and node clas-
sification. Their work restricted the attacks to perform modi-
fications on discrete structures, that is, an attacker is only al-
lowed to add or delete edges from a graph to construct a new
graph. White-box, practical black-box and restricted black-
box graph adversarial attack scenarios were studied. Authors
in [Zu¨gner et al., 2018] considered both test-time (evasion)
and training-time (data poisoning) attacks on node classifi-
cation task. In contrast to [Dai et al., 2018], besides adding
or removing edges in the graph, attackers in [Zu¨gner et al.,
2018] may modify node attributes. They designed adversar-
ial attacks based on a static surrogate model and evaluated
their impact by training a classifier on the data modified by
the attack. The resulting attack algorithm is for targeted at-
tacks on single nodes. It was shown that small perturbations
on the graph structure and node features are able to achieve
misclassification of a target node. A data poisoning attack
on unsupervised node representation learning, or node em-
beddings, has been proposed in [Bojcheski and Gu¨nnemann,
2018]. This attack is based on perturbation theory to maxi-
mize the loss obtained from DeepWalk [Perozzi et al., 2014].
In [Zu¨gner and Gu¨nnemann, 2019], training-time attacks on
GNNs were also investigated for node classification by per-
turbing the graph structure. The authors solved a min-max
problem in training-time attacks using meta-gradients and
treated the graph topology as a hyper-parameter to optimize.
3 Problem Statement
We begin by providing preliminaries on GNNs. We then for-
malize the attack threat model of GNNs in terms of edge per-
turbations, which we refer as ‘topology attack’.
3.1 Preliminaries on GNNs
It has been recently shown in [Kipf and Welling, 2016;
Velicˇkovic´ et al., 2017; Xu et al., 2019a] that GNN is pow-
erful in transductive learning, e.g., node classification under
graph data. That is, given a single network topology with
node features and a known subset of node labels, GNNs are
efficient to infer the classes of unlabeled nodes. Prior to
defining GNN, we first introduce the following graph nota-
tions. Let G = (V, E) denote an undirected and unweighted
graph, where V is the vertex (or node) set with cardinality
|V| = N , and E ∈ (V × V) denotes the edge set with cardi-
nality |E| = M . Let A represent a binary adjancency matrix.
By definition, we have Aij = 0 if (i, j) /∈ E . In a GNN, we
assume that each node i is associated with a feature vector
xi ∈ RM0 and a scalar label yi. The goal of GNN is to pre-
dict the class of an unlabeled node under the graph topology
A and the training data {(xi, yi)}Ntraini=1 . Here GNN uses input
features of all nodes but only Ntrain < N nodes with labeled
classes in the training phase.
Formally, the kth layer of a GNN model obeys the propa-
gation rule of the generic form
h
(k)
i = g
(k)
(
{W(k−1)h(k−1)j A˜ij , ∀j ∈ N (i)}
)
, ∀i ∈ [N ] (1)
where h(k)i ∈ RMk denotes the feature vector of node i at
layer k, h(0)i = xi ∈ RM0 is the input feature vector of node
i, g(k) is a possible composite mapping (activation) function,
W(k−1) ∈ RMk×Mk−1 is the trainable weight matrix at layer
(k − 1), A˜ij is the (i, j)th entry of A˜ that denotes a linear
mapping of A but with the same sparsity pattern, and N (i)
denotes node i’s neighbors together with itself, i.e., N (i) =
{j|(i, j) ∈ E , or j = i}.
A special form of GNN is graph convolutional networks
(GCN) [Kipf and Welling, 2016]. This is a recent approach
of learning on graph structures using convolution operations
which is promising as an embedding methodology. In GCNs,
the propagation rule (1) becomes [Kipf and Welling, 2016]
h
(k)
i = σ
∑
j∈Ni
(
W(k−1)h(k−1)j A˜ij
) , (2)
where σ(·) is the ReLU function. Let A˜i,: denote the ith row
of A˜ and H(k) =
[
(h
(k)
1 )
>; . . . ; (h(k)N )
>
]
, we then have the
standard form of GCN,
H(k) = σ
(
A˜H(k−1)(W(k−1))>
)
. (3)
Here A˜ is given by a normalized adjacency matrix A˜ =
Dˆ−1/2AˆDˆ−1/2, where Aˆ = A + I, and Dˆij = 0 if i 6= j
and Dˆii = 1>Aˆ:,i.
3.2 Topology Attack in Terms of Edge
Perturbation
We introduce a Boolean symmetric matrix S ∈ {0, 1}N×N to
encode whether or not an edge in G is modified. That is, the
edge connecting nodes i and j is modified (added or removed)
if and only if Sij = Sji = 1. Otherwise, Sij = 0 if i = j or
the edge (i, j) is not perturbed. Given the adjacency matrix
A, its supplement is given by A¯ = 11T − I − A, where I
is an identity matrix, and (11T − I) corresponds to the fully-
connected graph. With the aid of edge perturbation matrix S
and A¯, a perturbed graph topology A′ against A is given by
A′ = A+C ◦ S, C = A¯−A, (4)
where ◦ denotes the element-wise product. In (4), the pos-
itive entry of C denotes the edge that can be added to the
graph A, and the negative entry of C denotes the edge that
can be removed from A. We then formalize the concept of
topology attack to GNNs: Finding minimum edge perturba-
tions encoded by S in (4) to mislead GNNs. A more detailed
attack formulation will be studied in the next section.
4 Topology Attack Generation: A First-Order
Optimization Perspective
In this section, we first define attack loss (beyond the conven-
tional cross-entropy loss) under different attacking scenarios.
We then develop two efficient attack generation methods by
leveraging first-order optimization. We call the resulting at-
tacks projected gradient descent (PGD) topology attack and
min-max topology attack, respectively.
4.1 Attack Loss & Attack Generation
Let Z(S,W;A, {xi}) denote the prediction probability of a
GNN specified byA′ in (4) andW under input features {xi}.
Then Zi,c denotes the probability of assigning node i to class
c. It has been shown in existing works [Goodfellow et al.,
2015; Kurakin et al., 2017] that the negative cross-entropy
(CE) loss between the true labels (yi) and the predicted labels
({Zi,c}) can be used as an attack loss at node i, denoted by
fi(S,W;A, {xi}, yi). We can also propose a CW-type loss
similar to Carlili-Wagner (CW) attacks for attacking image
classifiers [Carlini and Wagner, 2017],
fi(S,W;A, {xi}, yi) = max
{
Zi,yi −max
c6=yi
Zi,c,−κ
}
, (5)
where κ ≥ 0 is a confidence level of making wrong decisions.
To design topology attack, we seek S in (4) to minimize
the per-node attack loss (CE-type or CW-type) given a finite
budge of edge perturbations. We consider two threat models:
a) attacking a pre-defined GNN with known W; b) attacking
an interactive GNN with re-trainable W. In the case a) of
fixed W, the attack generation problem can be cast as
minimize
s
∑
i∈V fi(s;W,A, {xi}, yi)
subject to 1>s ≤ , s ∈ {0, 1}n, (6)
where we replace the symmetric matrix variable S with its
vector form that consists of n := N(N − 1)/2 unique per-
turbation variables in S. We recall that fi could be either a
CE-type or a CW-type per-node attack loss. In the case b) of
re-trainableW, the attack generation problem has the follow-
ing min-max form
minimize
1>s≤,s∈{0,1}n
maximize
W
∑
i∈V
fi(s,W;A, {xi}, yi), (7)
where the inner maximization aims to constrain the attack
loss by retraining W so that attacking GNN is more difficult.
Motivated by targeted adversarial attacks against image
classifiers [Carlini and Wagner, 2017], we can define targeted
topology attacks that are restricted to perturb edges of tar-
geted nodes. In this case, we require to linearly constrain S
in (4) as Si,· = 0 if i is not a target node. As a result, both
attack formulations (6) and (7) have extra linear constraints
with respect to s, which can be readily handled by the opti-
mization solver introduced later. Without loss of generality,
we focus on untargeted topology attacks in this paper.
4.2 PGD Topology Attack
Problem (6) is a combinatorial optimization problem due to
the presence of Boolean variables. For ease of optimization,
we relax s ∈ {0, 1}n to its convex hull s ∈ [0, 1]n and solve
the resulting continuous optimization problem,
minimize
s
f(s) :=
∑
i∈V fi(s;W,A, {xi}, yi)
subject to s ∈ S, (8)
where S = {s |1T s ≤ , s ∈ [0, 1]n}. Suppose that the so-
lution of problem (8) is achievable, the remaining question is
how to recover a binary solution from it. Since the variable s
in (8) can be interpreted as a probabilistic vector, a random-
ization sampling [Liu et al., 2016] is suited for generating a
near-optimal binary topology perturbation; see details in Al-
gorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Random sampling from probabilistic to binary
topology perturbation
1: Input: probabilistic vector s, K is # of random trials
2: for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K do
3: draw binary vector u(k) following
u
(k)
i =
{
1 with probability si
0 with probability 1− si , ∀i (9)
4: end for
5: choose a vector s∗ from {u(k)} which yields the smallest
attack loss f(u(k)) under 1T s ≤ .
We solve the continuous optimization problem (8) by pro-
jected gradient descent (PGD),
s(t) = ΠS
[
s(t−1) − ηtgˆt
]
, (10)
where t denotes the iteration index of PGD, ηt > 0 is the
learning rate at iteration t, gˆt = ∇f(s(t−1)) denotes the gra-
dient of the attack loss f evaluated at s(t−1), and ΠS(a) :=
arg mins∈S ‖s − a‖22 is the projection operator at a over the
constraint set S. In Proposition 1, we show that the projection
operation yields the closed-form solution.
Proposition 1 Given S = {s |1T s ≤ , s ∈ [0, 1]n}, the
projection operation at the point a with respect to S is
ΠS(a) =

P[0,1][a− µ1] If µ > 0 and1TP[0,1][a− µ1] = ,
P[0,1][a] If 1TP[0,1][a] ≤ ,
(11)
where P[0,1](x) = x if x ∈ [0, 1], 0 if x < 0, and 1 if x > 1.
Proof: We express the projection problem as
minimize
s
1
2‖s− a‖22 + I[0,1](s)
subject to 1>s ≤ , (12)
where I[0,1](s) = 0 if s ∈ [0, 1]n, and∞ otherwise.
The Lagrangian function of problem (12) is given by
1
2
‖s− a‖22 + I[0,1](s) + µ(1>s− )
=
∑
i
(
1
2
(si − ai)2 + I[0,1](si) + µsi
)
− µ, (13)
where µ ≥ 0 is the dual variable. The minimizer to the above
Lagrangian function (with respect to the variable s) is
s = P[0,1](a− µ1), (14)
where P[0,1] is taken elementwise. Besides the stationary
condition (14), other KKT conditions for solving problem
(12) are
µ(1>s− ) = 0, (15)
µ ≥ 0, (16)
1>s ≤ . (17)
If µ > 0, then the solution to problem (12) is given by (14),
where the dual variable µ is determined by (14) and (15)
1TP[0,1][a− µ1] = , and µ > 0. (18)
If µ = 0, then the solution to problem (12) is given by (14)
and (17),
s = P[0,1](a), and 1
>s ≤ , (19)
The proof is complete. 
In the projection operation (11), one might need to solve
the scalar equation 1TP[0,1][a − µ1] =  with respect to
the dual variable µ. This can be accomplished by apply-
ing the bisection method [Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004;
Liu et al., 2015] over µ ∈ [min(a − 1),max(a)]. That
is because 1TP[0,1][a − max(a)1] ≤  and 1TP[0,1][a −
min(a − 1)1] ≥ , where max and min return the largest
and smallest entry of a vector. We remark that the bi-
section method converges in the logarithmic rate given by
log2 [(max(a)−min(a− 1))/ξ] for the solution of ξ-error
tolerance. We summarize the PGD topology attack in Algo-
rithm 2.
Algorithm 2 PGD topology attack on GNN
1: Input: s(0),  > 0, learning rate ηt, and iterations T
2: for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
3: gradient descent: a(t) = s(t−1) − ηt∇f(s(t−1))
4: call projection operation in (11)
5: end for
6: call Algorithm 1 to return s∗, and the resulting A′ in (4).
4.3 Min-max Topology Attack
We next solve the problem of min-max attack generation in
(7). By convex relaxation on the Boolean variables, we obtain
the following continuous optimization problem
minimize
s∈S
maximize
W
f(s,W) =
∑
i∈V
fi(s,W;A, {xi}, yi), (20)
where S has been defined in (8). We solve problem (20)
by first-order alternating optimization [Lu et al., 2019a;
Lu et al., 2019b], where the inner maximization is solved
by gradient ascent, and the outer minimization is handled by
PGD same as (10). We summarize the min-max topology
attack in Algorithm 3. We remark that one can perform mul-
tiple maximization steps within each iteration of alternating
optimization. This strikes a balance between the computation
efficiency and the convergence accuracy [Chen et al., 2017;
Qian et al., 2018].
5 Robust Training for GNNs
With the aid of first-order attack generation methods, we now
introduce our adversarial training for GNNs via robust opti-
mization. Similar formulation is also used in [Madry et al.,
2017]. In adversarial training, we solve a min-max problem
for robust optimization:
minimize
W
maximize
s∈S
−f(s,W), (21)
Algorithm 3 Min-max topology attack to solve (20)
1: Input: given W(0), s(0), learning rates βt and ηt, and
iteration numbers T
2: for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
3: inner maximization over W: given s(t−1), obtain
Wt = Wt−1 + βt∇Wf(st−1,Wt−1)
4: outer minimization over s: given W(t), running
PGD (10), where gˆt = ∇sf(st−1,Wt)
5: end for
6: call Algorithm 1 to return s∗, and the resulting A′ in (4).
where f(x,W) denotes the attack loss specified in (20). Fol-
lowing the idea of adversarial training for image classifiers
in [Madry et al., 2017], we restrict the loss function f as the
CE-type loss. This formulation tries to minimize the training
loss at the presence of topology perturbations.
We note that problems (21) and (7) share a very similar
min-max form, however, they are not equivalent since the loss
f is neither convex with respect to s nor concave with respect
to W, namely, lacking saddle point property [Boyd and Van-
denberghe, 2004]. However, there exists connection between
(7) and (21); see Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Given a general attack loss function f , prob-
lem (21) is equivalent to
maximize
W
minimize
s∈S
f(s,W), (22)
which further yields (22) ≤ (7).
Proof: By introducing epigraph variable p [Boyd and Van-
denberghe, 2004], problem (21) can be rewritten as
minimize
W,p
p
subject to −f(s,W) ≤ p, ∀s ∈ S. (23)
By changing variable q := −p, problem (23) is equivalent to
maximize
W,q
q
subject to f(s,W) ≥ q,∀s ∈ S. (24)
By eliminating the epigraph variable q, problem (24) be-
comes (22). By max-min inequality [Boyd and Vanden-
berghe, 2004, Sec. 5.4], we finally obtain that
maximize
W
minimize
s∈S
f(s,W) ≤ minimize
s∈S
maximize
W
f(s,W).
The proof is now complete. 
We summarize the robust training algorithm in Algorithm 4
for solving problem (22). Similar to Algorithm 3, one usually
performs multiple inner minimization steps (with respect to s)
within each iteration t to have a solution towards minimizer
during alternating optimization. This improves the stability
of convergence in practice [Qian et al., 2018; Madry et al.,
2017].
6 Experiments
In this section, we present our experimental results for both
topology attack and defense methods on a graph convolu-
tional networks (GCN) [Kipf and Welling, 2016]. We demon-
strate the misclassification rate and the convergence of the
Algorithm 4 Robust training for solving problem (22)
1: Input: given W(0), s(0), learning rates βt and ηt, and
iteration numbers T
2: for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
3: inner minimization over s: given W(t−1), running
PGD (10), where gˆt = ∇sf(st−1,Wt−1)
4: outer maximization over W: given s(t), obtain
Wt = Wt−1 + βt∇Wf(st,Wt−1)
5: end for
6: return WT .
proposed 4 attack methods: negative cross-entropy loss via
PGD attack (CE-PGD), CW loss via PGD attack (CW-PGD),
negative cross-entropy loss via min-max attack (CE-min-
max), CW loss via min-max attack (CW-min-max). We then
show the improved robustness of GCN by leveraging our pro-
posed robust training against topology attacks.
6.1 Experimental Setup
We evaluate our methods on two well-known datasets: Cora
and Citeseer [Sen et al., 2008]. Both datasets contain un-
weighted edges which can be generated as symmetric ad-
jacency matrix A and sparse bag-of-words feature vectors
which can be treated the input of GCN. To train the model, all
node feature vectors are fed into GCN but with only 140 and
120 labeled nodes for Cora and Citeseer, respectively. The
number of test labeled nodes is 1000 for both datasets. At
each experiment, we repeat 5 times based on different splits
of training/testing nodes and report mean ± standard devia-
tion of misclassification rate (namely, 1 − prediction accu-
racy) on testing nodes.
6.2 Attack Performance
We compare our four attack methods (CE-PGD, CW-PGD,
CE-min-max, CW-min-max) with DICE (‘delete edges in-
ternally, connect externally’) [Waniek et al., 2018], Meta-
Self attack [Zu¨gner and Gu¨nnemann, 2019] and greedy at-
tack, a variant of Meta-Self attack without weight re-training
for GCN. The greedy attack is considered as a fair compari-
son with our CE-PGD and CW-PGD attacks, which are gen-
erated on a fixed GCN without weight re-training. In min-
max attacks (CE-min-max and CW-min-max), we show mis-
classification rates against both natural and retrained models
from Algorithm 3, and compare them with the state-of-the-
art Meta-Self attack. For a fair comparison, we use the same
performance evaluation criterion in Meta-Self, testing nodes’
predicted labels (not their ground-truth label) by an indepen-
dent pre-trained model that can be used during the attack. In
the attack problems (6) and (7), unless specified otherwise the
maximum number of perturbed edges is set to be 5% of the
total number of existing edges in the original graph. In Algo-
rithm 1, we set the iteration number of random sampling as
K = 20 and choose the perturbed topology with the highest
misclassification rate which also satisfies the edge perturba-
tion constraint.
In Table 1, we present the misclassification rate of different
attack methods against both natural and retrained model from
(20). Here we recall that the retrained model arises due to
the scenario of attacking an interactive GCN with re-trainable
weights (Algorithm 3). For comparison, we also show the
misclassification rate of a natural model with the true topol-
ogy (denoted by ‘clean’). As we can see, to attack the natural
model, our proposed attacks achieve better misclassification
rate than the existing methods. We also observe that com-
pared to min-max attacks (CE-min-max and CW-min-max),
CE-PGD and CW-PGD yield better attacking performance
since it is easier to attack a pre-defined GCN. To attack the
model that allows retraining, we set 20 steps of inner maxi-
mization per iteration of Algorithm 3. The results show that
our proposed min-max attack achieves very competitive per-
formance compared to Meta-Self attack. Note that evaluating
the attack performance on the retrained model obtained from
(20) is not quite fair since the retrained weights could be sub-
optimal and induce degradation in classification.
fixed
natural
model
Cora Citeseer
clean 18.2± 0.1 28.9± 0.3
DICE 18.9± 0.2 29.8± 0.4
Greedy 25.2± 0.2 34.6± 0.3
Meta-Self 22.7± 0.3 31.2± 0.5
CE-PGD 28.0± 0.1 36.0± 0.2
CW-PGD 27.8± 0.4 37.1± 0.5
CE-min-max 26.4± 0.1 34.1± 0.3
CW-min-max 26.0± 0.3 34.7± 0.6
retrained
model
from (20)
Meta-Self 29.6± 0.4 39.7± 0.3
CE-min-max 30.8± 0.2 37.5± 0.3
CW-min-max 30.5± 0.5 39.6± 0.4
Table 1: Misclassification rates (%) under 5% perturbed edges
In Fig. 1, we present the CE-loss and the CW-loss of the
proposed topology attacks against the number of iterations in
Algorithm 2. Here we choose T = 200 and ηt = 200/
√
t. As
we can see, the method of PGD converges gracefully against
iterations. This verifies the effectiveness of the first-order op-
timization based attack generation method.
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Figure 1: CE-PGD and CW-PGD attack losses on Cora and Citeseer
datasets.
6.3 Defense Performance
In what follows, we invoke Algorithm 4 to generate robust
GCN via adversarial training. We set T = 1000, βt = 0.01
and ηt = 200/
√
t. We run 20 steps for inner minimization.
Inspired by [Madry et al., 2017], we increase the hidden units
from 16 to 32 in order to create more capacity for this more
complicated classifier. Initially, we set the maximum number
of edges we can modify as 5% of total existing edges.
In Figure 2, we present convergence of our robust training.
As we can see, the loss drops reasonably and the 1, 000 it-
erations are necessary for robust training rather than normal
training process which only need 200 iterations. We also ob-
serve that our robust training algorithm does not harm the test
accuracy when  = 5%, but successfully improves the robust-
ness as the attack success rate drops from 28.0% to 22.0% in
Cora dataset as shown in Table 2,
After showing the effectiveness of our algorithm, we ex-
plore deeper in adversarial training on GCN. We aim to show
how large  we can use in robust training. So we set  from
5% to 20% and apply CE-PGD attack following the same 
setting. The results are presented in Table 3. Note that when
 = 0, the first row shows misclassification rates of test nodes
on natural graph as the baseline for lowest misclassification
rate we can obtain; the first column shows the CE-PGD at-
tack misclassification rates of natural model as the baseline
for highest misclassification rate we can obtain. We can con-
clude that when a robust model trained under an  constraint,
the model will gain robustness under this  distinctly. Con-
sidering its importance to keep the original graph test perfor-
mance, we suggest generating robust model under  = 0.1.
Moreover, please refer to Figure 3 that a) our robust trained
model can provide universal defense to CE-PGD, CW-PGD
and Greedy attacks; b) when increasing , the difference be-
tween both test accuracy and CE-PGD attack accuracy in-
creases substantially, which also implies the robust model un-
der larger  is harder to obtain.
Cora Citeseer
A/natural model 18.2± 0.1 28.9± 0.1
A/robust model 18.1± 0.3 28.7± 0.4
A′/natural model 28.0± 0.1 36.0± 0.2
A′/robust model 22.0± 0.2 32.2± 0.4
Table 2: Misclassification rates (%) of robust training (smaller is
better for defense task) with at most 5% of edge perturbations. A
means the natural graph, A′ means the generated adversarial graph
under  = 5%. X/M means the misclassification rate of using
model M on graph X.
 in robust training (in %)
 in
attack
(in %)
0 5 10 15 20
0 18.1 18.2 19.0 20.2 21.3
5 27.9 22.0 23.9 24.8 26.5
10 32.7 32.1 26.4 27.7 31.0
15 36.7 36.2 33.4 29.7 32.9
20 40.2 40.1 36.3 36.3 33.5
Table 3: Misclassification rates (%) of CE-PGD attack against ro-
bust training model versus (smaller is better) different  (%) on Cora
dataset. Here  = 0 in training means natural model and  = 0 in
attack means unperturbed topology.
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Figure 2: Robust training loss on Cora and Citeseer datasets.
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Figure 3: Test accuracy of robust model (no attack), CE-PGD at-
tack against robust model, CW-PGD attack against robust model,
Greedy attack against robust model and CE-PGD attack against nat-
ural model for different  used in robust training and test on Cora
dataset.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we first introduce an edge perturbation based
topology attack framework that overcomes the difficulty of
attacking discrete graph structure data from a first-order op-
timization perspective. Our extensive experiments show that
with only a fraction of edges changed, we are able to compro-
mise state-of-the-art graph neural networks model noticeably.
Additionally, we propose an adversarial training framework
to improve the robustness of GNN models based on our at-
tack methods. Experiments on different datasets show that
our method is able to improve the GNN model’s robustness
against both gradient based and greedy search based attack
methods without classification performance drop on original
graph. We believe that this paper provides potential means for
theoretical study and improvement of the robustness of deep
learning models on graph data.
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